Chapter 1
Support to the Force

"Contractors and civilians provide support from within as well as from outside the theater of operations. In theater, contractors and DOD civilians assigned to a USAMC logistics support organization perform specified support functions."

FM 100-5, Operations, June 14, 1993

Envision the impact on readiness if Anniston Army Depot were 25 miles behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT), and not just Anniston but all the other depots and selected manufacturers. Visualize the impact on operational capability if the latest technology could be fielded directly to the soldiers in the foxhole. Imagine how responsive the logistics system would be if it could project forward the critical pieces of the industrial base. That is the United States Army Materiel Command's (USAMC) Logistics Support Element (LSE) mission.

Prior to providing a detailed discussion on the LSE, this chapter will discuss the environment in which the LSE will operate, the National Command Authorities (NCA), and theater organization and structure. Also, this chapter explains how the LSE links specific strategic logistics in the continental United States (CONUS) with operational and tactical logistics in a theater of operations.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The NCA exercises authority and control of the armed forces through the chain of command with two distinct branches. The first branch runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch runs from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments to the chiefs of the Services for execution of Service functions.

Commanders of combatant commands (COCOM) are responsible to the NCA for preparedness of their commands and for executing and accomplishing their assigned missions. The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) communicates the directions of the NCA within the chain of command. Though he does not exercise military command over any combatant force, all communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders pass through the CJCS. Figure 1-1 displays the chain of command.

National Command Authorities

This portion of the chain of command begins with the President and SECDEF, who make up the NCA. They alone have the constitutional authority to direct US armed forces into military action. Upon NCA authorization, the decision passes through the CJCS to combatant commanders. The President, with the advice of the SECDEF and CJCS, establishes COCOMs and appoints combatant commanders.



Figure 1-1
The Chain of Command

Military Departments

The military departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF. Through the Service chiefs, the secretaries of the military departments exercise authority, direction, and control of their forces that are not assigned to combatant commanders. This chain of command branch is separate and distinct from the branch that exists within the COCOMs. The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of their forces assigned or attached to COCOMs. They fulfill these responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the commanders of Service component commands assigned to the COCOMs. Using ADCON, the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) is responsible for preparing, maintaining, training, equipping, administering, and supporting Army forces assigned to the COCOMs. The ASCC is also responsible for providing support to other Services as specified in a variety of Department of Defense (DOD) instructions and regulations. The emphasis of the military departments is

to provide administrative (legal, personnel, finance) and logistical support to respective Service forces.

THEATER STRUCTURE

A theater is a geographical area outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for which a commander of a unified command is assigned military responsibility. From the strategic context, it is a required level of international military cooperation or the degree of necessary dedicated US military resources. These perspectives may influence how the Army conducts operations in each theater.

Theater of War

When the NCA authorizes combat operations, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), with NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approval, delineates a strategic theater of war which may encompass part or all of the original peacetime or conflict theater. Part of a theater may be in a state of war, while other areas remain in conflict or peace. (See Figure 1-2.)

Theater of Operations

If the CINC determines that he should sub-divide his theater of war to contend with more than one major threat, he may designate subordinate theaters or areas of operations (AOs) for each major threat. The theaters of operation refer to those portions of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations for extended periods.



Figure 1-2
Theater Organization During War

Communications Zone

The communications zone (COMMZ) extends from the rear of the combat zone (CZ) in the theater of operations to the CONUS base. Its size may vary depending on the size of the theater of operations, size of forces required for operations and sustainment, depth required, lines of communication (LOCs), enemy capability to interdict and disrupt sustainment operations, geography, and political boundaries. The COMMZ contains the LOCs. Within the theater logistics base, LOCs provide supply, maintenance, field services, transportation, combat health support (CHS), personnel support and evacuation and other services required for immediate support and sustainment of the field force.

Within the COMMZ, the CINC will normally establish a theater logistics base. The CINC usually locates the logistics base at the junction of the various intratheater and intertheater LOCs. It will typically contain logistics facilities required to support the theater such as air and sea ports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs), marshaling areas, storage areas, movement control points, logistics headquarters and units, together with airfields and air bases, transitioning land forces, theater missile defense forces, the theater rear headquarters, and strategic reserves.

THE ARMY IN-THEATER

The three crucial roles for the conduct of Army operations in a joint and multinational environment are joint, multinational, and interagency or United Nations (UN) coordination; conduct of operations; and support of operations. Senior Army leaders, using an operational-level perspective, task-organize the Army to maximize its capabilities in the theater. The Army's theater organization provides the means for executing the designs of operational art while facilitating joint operations.

The Army Service Component Commander

The ASCC, formerly known as the theater Army Commander, is responsible for preparing, training, equipping, administering, and providing combat service support (CSS) to Army forces assigned to unified or specified commands. He supports the theater combatant CINC by conducting Army operations to support or attain his objectives.

The ASCC is responsible to the unified commander for accomplishing peacetime missions and functions and for planning and preparing for war. The ASCC also communicates directly with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) on uni-Service matters relating to administration, personnel, training, CSS, communications, doctrine, combat developments, and intelligence. In preparing for and conducting operations, the ASCC coordinates with Navy and Air Force component commanders, subordinate commanders within the unified and multinational commands, nongovernmental organizations/private voluntary organizations (NGOs/PVOs), and other agencies, where required.

The ASCC usually commands and controls all US Army forces in the theater. However, the theater joint force commander (JFC) can establish alternate command and control (C2) arrangements. Command arrangements, statutory requirements, and other considerations also affect command relationships.

Army Support Structure

The ASCC is responsible for providing the necessary capabilities required by the Army forces assigned to a unified command. The Army designs its support structure to provide the ASCC or unified commander flexibility based on a building-block principle--a phased expansion of capabilities and functions linked to mission requirements.

Building the support structure occurs after considering mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T); strategic lift; pre-positioned assets; host nation support (HNS); and other factors of the logistics preparation of the theater (LPT). Commanders tailor their forces to meet the demands of specific crises. Key considerations are selecting a support structure appropriate to the mission and time-phasing its deployment and expeditious employment. Balancing combat, combat support (CS), and CSS during deployment is important because commanders must seek to gain the initiative early, protect the force, support the force, and simultaneously prepare for future operations. Crucial to the successful reception, staging, onward movement, sustainment, and protection of projected forces is the timely introduction of an adequate force structure in the theater. This force structure must be regionally oriented, flexible, and properly tailored.

The ASCC must assemble and tailor force modules to meet the support requirements of a force based on its operational mission. The support structure starts with a nucleus of minimum essential support functions and capabilities. As the deployed force grows, the support structure gains required capabilities and expands. The Army support structure must be capable of providing support to the deployed forces; to units in or passing through the COMMZ; and to other units, activities, or forces as the unified CINC directs.

For limited operations, echelons above corps (EAC) support operations will be commanded either directly by the ASCC through the deputy commanding general (DCG) for support, or through the early entry module of the Theater Support Command (TSC). In larger, more mature operations, the complete TSC headquarters may deploy. The TSC is the senior logistics headquarters in-theater. The modular nature of the TSC minimizes strategic lift requirements by allowing the commander to ensure deployment of only essential support elements. In addition, the TSC becomes the sustainment single point of contact for most CSS, including the LSE and selected CS operational level units. This simplifies CSS and CS planning and execution for the ASCC. The LSE is assigned or attached to the TSC.

The corps and echelons below corps normally operate at the tactical level and are not resourced to accomplish operational level support. They require augmentation by operational-level CSS organizations to provide logistics support at the operational level. These augmented support organizations may serve as an operational-level support command when deployed.

The tactical-level support organization may be further augmented by elements from the strategic logistics system when the tactical organization operates as the highest Army component in a joint force. In this capacity, the tactical commander would be the Army interface with the JTF for all operational and support matters. Ideally, when conducting operations at the operational level, an echelon not directly responsible for tactical operations performs them.

In multinational operations, the theater may require a large support structure to provide support throughout the AO. The ultimate base of logistics support for the theater is provided through the TSC. The LSE supports the TSC by projecting to the theater the full capability of the CONUS logistics system with its national inventory control points (NICPs), depots, arsenals, factories, and the industrial base. The entire CSS system, from the FLOT to CONUS, provides the combat forces with what is needed, when it is needed, and where it is needed.

THE LEVELS OF SUPPORT

When tailoring a support force for a particular plan or crisis response, logisticians must consider that regardless of the size of the supported force, support will move

through the logistics system to produce the sustainment needed. The three levels of logistical support--strategic, operational, and tactical--correlate to the three levels of war (see Figure 1-3).

Strategic Logistics

The strategic logistics system supports the attainment of broad goals and objectives established by the NCA in national security policies. The strategic--national and theater--level encompasses those political, economic, informational, and military measures that contribute to the strategic theater campaign plan. It includes all elements involved in providing logistical support to a theater in the various operational areas.

Strategic logistics agencies--General Services Administration (GSA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), US Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA), and USAMC--receive and fill all requisitions from both forward-presence and CONUS-based deploying forces. Forward-presence and force projection forces' requisitions receive priority. Strategic logistics functions are performed in CONUS, within the theater base, or are coordinated through the TSC or LSE in the COMMZ.

The strategic/operational bond of logistics in a forward-presence, force-projection strategy is at the theater level. This bond is seamless through the use of the LSE and other elements with military contractors and deployed civilian employees providing support within, as well as outside, the theater of war and theater of operations. Strategically centralized management and distribution of personnel and materiel and decentralized execution at the operational and tactical levels optimize the logistics flow.



Figure 1-3
National Theater Logistics System

The deployed LSE coordinates all USAMC strategic support actions in-theater. The LSE is a forward element of the strategic/national logistics base. Early deployment of the LSE will ensure a positive link from the deploying units to the national strategic system. In some cases, early deployment can offset gaps in the logistics force infrastructure by shifting CSS workload temporarily to selected elements of the national/industrial base in the theater. When deployed into a theater, the LSE provides limited depot-level logistics support. When properly tasked organized, the LSE can provide the support and service for reception and staging for early arriving units in-theater. The initial deployment of the LSE will be for logistics assistance along with the other USAMC logistics assistance personnel (LAP) assigned to major units. The LSE normally does not replace capabilities provided by table of organization and equipment (TOE) units in the force structure.

Operational-Level CSS

Operational-level CSS supports the ClNC's plan in either a mature or immature theater. In the theater, base camps and forward logistics facilities provide strategic and operational CSS to tactical CSS bases. Operational CSS links strategic logistics to tactical CSS on the battlefield, ensuring success at the tactical level. The TSC, supported by the LSE, provides those links.

Operational and tactical CSS differ by the longer planning and preparation time required to support extended operations. Operational support attempts to balance current consumption with the needs of subsequent major operations. Operational logisticians focus on establishing and maintaining LOCs and sustaining the force in the theater of operations consistent with the ClNC's strategic logistics priorities. They also focus on reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of equipment and personnel; planning, coordinating, managing, and directing the positioning of supply, maintenance, and field service activities; creating transportation networks; providing movement assets; and obtaining HNS and other support required to permit units to accomplish their missions.

At the operational level, the distinction between operations and support begins to erode. Synonymous with operations at this level of planning, support becomes a significant undertaking of the TSC and his staff. Army commanders at the operational level may operate in unified, joint, multinational, or interagency operations.

The ASCC, based on METT-T and CINC guidance, develops an organization capable of executing CSS tasks and then directs the integration of CSS to most effectively support the operations plan. Army forces (ARFORs) conduct operational-level missions; however, tactical (corps and below) units may fill this role when they are operating at the operational level of war. When this occurs, the ASCC must augment the tactical ARFORs when they are conducting operational-level missions, Information systems at this level enhance the process and provide in-transit visibility (ITV) and total asset visibility (TAV), allowing commanders to know precise locations of resources. Commanders at the operational level must establish and/or coordinate support functions to allow tactical commanders to focus their attention on tactical-level operations rather than operational-level support activities.

Tactical CSS

Tactical CSS includes activities necessary to support military operations and activities that precede and follow them. The tactical logistician focuses on acquiring and providing to the using unit support required to win the tactical battles in the CZ. He continually assesses inbound operational support as well as any joint, HNS, or coalition support provided. At this level, the essential

functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, technical assistance, personnel service support (PSS), CHS, and field services are delivered to soldiers to permit them to accomplish their assigned missions. The LSE provides logistics assistance personnel to units to assist with unit readiness.

The three levels of logistics must blend together, creating a seamless system of support. The continuation of a seamless system makes the demarcation line between the levels less visible as organizations and functions interweave within each one. The LSE assists the commander with this interweave. Figure 1-4 depicts this system.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT ELEMENT

USAMC has a role at all three levels of doctrinal logistics. USAMC's LSE spans the bridge between the strategic and tactical levels, thereby helping create a seamless logistics system (see Figure 1-5).

The LSE, a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) activity, performs logistics functions not normally performed by TOE units. It is an organization that USAMC may staff with any combination of civilian and military personnel required to perform specialized tasks. Civilians may be DOD or they may be contractors who agree to deploy to support highly sophisticated equipment. USAMC designates on a personnel deployment roster (PDR) and the LSE contingency TDA those military and DOD civilian personnel who can fulfill special requirements of the LSE. The LSE's unique skills include depot maintenance, oil analysis, calibration of test equipment, ammunition



Figure 1-4
Melding of Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Logistics

surveillance, release of prepositioned strategic stocks, materiel fielding technology insertion, and battle damage assessment (BDA).

The LSE plays a vital role in all contingencies involving war and across the full range of military operations. The ASCC normally assigns or attaches operational control of the LSE to the TSC. However, the ASCC determines who will lead any particular logistics support operation based on METT-T. In many domestic and small non-military contingencies, it is conceivable that the LSE may become the initial lead element, controlling other DOD elements. In other cases as the numbered logistics headquarters begins to redeploy, the LSE may assume proponency for logistics C2. The LSE will maintain the appropriate technical ties to USAMC, DLA, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Forces Command (FORSCOM). When the LSE is assigned or attached to the TSC, the TSC will identify force requirements and assign tasks and priorities. The TSC will battle roster selected positions from the LSE to support its operations.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LSE

Logistics wholesalers have always supported combat forces in-theater. In the past there were sutlers and teamsters. Today, there are engineers and scientists. The military cannot operate without the logistics strategic/wholesaler being in the theater. However, it seldom uses the most effective and efficient operating procedures. What was missing before was an organization to control and integrate logistics efforts.



Figure 1-5
USAMC Role at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Level

Civilians and contractors traditionally provide logistics support to the combat forces. During the Korean War, the Army used contractors. However, they often were undependable. In Vietnam, numerous independent teams provided excellent support. However, they came and went on their own, often leaving the combatant commanders uninformed. There was no one organization responsible for their C2.

Since Korea and Vietnam, but prior to Operation Desert Storm (ODS), USAMC deployed LAP personnel with their assigned units and established LAP offices to control their efforts. This worked well. However, no one centrally controlled other USAMC personnel in the AOs. Therefore, as the strategic logistician during ODS, USAMC saw a compelling need to form a centralized C2 headquarters to coordinate all USAMC activities in-theater.

Thus, the concept for the LSE evolved out of ODS--a single C2 element centrally managing all USAMC personnel, calling forward additional elements as required, and integrating these forward elements into the theater.

To meet these essential requirements, USAMC formed a 3000-man Army Support Group (ASG). This ASG ultimately became the foundation for the LSE and reinforced the critical need for civilians on the battlefield. It performed impressively during ODS. Accomplishments included:

- Upgrading 1000 Ml main battle tanks to the more powerful and protected M1Al configuration.
- Repainting more than 10,000 vehicles, mostly from VII Corps, with chemical resistant desert camouflage paint.
- Repairing approximately 43,000 items including 12,000 pieces of chemical defensive equipment, 9,000 weapons systems, and 3,500 automotive components.
- Issuing 1,600 items from its Reparable Exchange Activity and processing more than 23,000 retrograde lines.
- Preparing equipment for retrograde movement following the ground campaign.

After ODS, USAMC formalized and submitted to HQDA for approval, the concept of providing in-theater depot level support. However, before HQDA approved the concept, USAMC dispatched LSE-type elements to Somalia. This operation was very successful logistically, further validating the LSE concept.

While proven valuable to satisfy crises overseas, the LSE is capable of assisting with natural disaster emergencies in CONUS. The LSE demonstrated its utility and responsiveness when it deployed to Florida following Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Working with government officials and volunteer organizations, the LSE (briefly designated as the Logistics Support Group) established forward humanitarian depot sites so that relief supplies could rapidly be pushed far forward. Once operational, USAMC sites processed hundreds of tons of materiel for transport to disaster stricken communities. In 1994 and 1995, the LSE assisted with natural disaster relief for four separate floods and two seasons of wildfires.

Responsive, rapidly deployable, flexible, and tailorable, LSEs are capable of satisfying mission requirements whenever and wherever needed. Future crises undoubtedly will continue to validate the utility of LSEs and the need to integrate them into current planning and future operations.

Figure 1-6 graphically depicts the need for the LSE. The following summarizes the need for the LSE.



Figure 1-6
Why the LSE?

First, the LSE provides direct, positive contact with the customer. The LSE commander, working for the TSC commander, coordinates directly with the customer and responds to his requirements and desires.

Secondly, the LSE can fill gaps between theater logistics requirements and the capabilities of existing TOE units on the ground. It can perform USAMC missions such as diagnostic training and troubleshooting; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) calibration; oil analysis; depot maintenance; and a host of other functions. Elements of the LSE can also assist with supply redistribution, reconstitution, and retrograde operations.

Thirdly, the LSE is the forward element of the USAMC national logistics base. The LSE can provide many of the same support capabilities forward to the theater of operations that USAMC provides in CONUS. By performing support forward, the LSE shortens the logistics pipeline and positively impacts readiness.

Finally, USAMC is the Army executive agent for maintaining and handing-off Army War Reserve (AWR) prepositioned stocks. USAMC will use the LSE to hand-off these packages to deploying/deployed units to use in combat operations.